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ABSTRACT 
With a view to upholding fundamental (social) rights in Europe in times of economic 
crisis, attention is to be paid to the assessment of regressive implementation of social 
rights during the recent period, under the applicable international instruments for the 
protection of human rights. The present contribution focuses on the divergent 
decisions by the European Committee of Social Rights and the European Court of 
Human Rights on 'austerity measures', bearing in mind the 'complementarity' 
between the two underlying treaties ‒ the European Social Charter and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. While the different grounds of violation available in the 
two treaties may explain divergent outcomes, arguably the most relevant factor 
concerns the interpretative method(s) followed by each body, especially the varying 
degree of deference accorded to the national authorities in the sphere of economic 
and social policy.  
RÉSUMÉ 
Dans la perspective de maintenir et respecter les droits (sociaux) fondamentaux en 
temps de crise économique, il y a lieu de considérer l'évaluation des restrictions 
récemment apportées à la jouissance de ces droits, par rapport aux instruments 
internationaux de protection des droits de l'homme. La présente contribution analyse 
les décisions divergentes du Comité européen des droits sociaux et de la Cour 
européenne des droits de l'homme envers ces mesures 'd'austérité', tout en 
rappelant la 'complementarité' qui avait été envisagée entre la Charte sociale 
européenne et la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Si des conclusions 
divergentes peuvent s'expliquer en raison des différents motifs de la violation dans 
les deux traités, la question qui relève le plus a probablement trait aux méthodes 
interprétatives adoptées par le Comité et la Cour, surtout en ce qui concerne le 
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différent degré de déférence accordé aux autorités nationales dans la sphère des 
politiques économique et sociale.  
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SUMMARY: 1. The challenges posed by the crisis to the European protection of 
social rights. - 2. Similar ‒ but not identical ‒ claims. - 3. The relevance of according 
narrower or wider discretion to States. - 4. Critical remarks. 
 
1. The challenges posed by the crisis to the European protection of social 
rights  
The Turin conference will reflect on the question of respect for human rights by 
national 'austerity measures' that many European States have adopted in order to 
face the economic and financial crisis. Such issue has been dealt with by national 
supreme courts as well as European courts and monitoring bodies. It is closely and 
intricately interlocked with the other questions which will be discussed in Turin to re-
launch the European Social Charter. In several European countries, restrictive 
measures on public spending and higher taxation for the purposes of budgetary 
consolidation have seriously impacted on individuals' lifestyle and means of 
subsistence. The enjoyment of their economic and social, as well as political and civil 
rights has been affected1. In certain notable cases, such measures were adopted 
according to the requirements stemming from the EU fiscal discipline and the 
'conditionality' of lending policies at the European and international levels. Arguably, 
an account of the contribution of the European Social Charter (ESC)2 to the crisis exit 
phase, with a view to integrating the Charter's standards into the EU legal order and 
policies, would help the EU reach the objective of a "highly competitive social market 
economy" (art. 3§3 TEU). This would also help re-gain citizens' confidence. 
Furthermore, a fresh consideration of the Charter's role in times of economic crisis 
would contribute to the effective implementation of the concept of indivisibility of 
rights, within a European system of rights' protection, where different texts and their 
                                                          
1 See, among other studies, HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (2009); COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMISSIONER FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2013); EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2012). 
2 In the present contribution, reference will be made to the European Social Charter without 
distinguishing between the Charter of 1961 and the Revised Charter of 1996 which, among other 
innovations, covers additional social rights. In particular, the rights coming into relevance in the 
analysis below are present in both texts, notably with the difference reported in ft. no. 24 below, as 
regards art. 12 on the right to social security. All EU member States have ratified the Revised Charter, 
except for Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, which are bound by the ESC 1961. 
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control bodies share the same underlying values of human dignity, rule of law, and 
democracy.  
However, with a view to overcoming the crisis by upholding fundamental (social) 
rights in Europe, policy makers and legal operators at the national and European 
levels are confronted with a somewhat puzzling assessment of regressive 
implementation of social rights during the recent crisis, under the main European 
instruments for the protection of human rights. Although similar measures were 
challenged before the relevant bodies of the Council of Europe, the EU and the ILO 
in particular (see 2.1 below), the decisions issued were not wholly coherent if not 
even sharply contrasting, at least at a first sight. The most striking example of 
divergent outcomes arises in the Greek financial 'rescue' context. The Greek 
Confederation of Public Sector Trade Unions (ADEDY) and other organizations and 
individuals alleged the violation of human rights i) by Greek austerity measures, 
before the European Committee of Social rights (ECSR) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), and ii) by EU acts before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). While the Luxembourg court declared the applications 
inadmissible for lack of locus standi of the applicants, the ECSR found that the 
challenged measures did constitute a violation of several rights recognized by the 
European Social Charter, while the European Court of Human Rights declared the 
claims manifestly ill-founded and the applications inadmissible, as it considered that 
Greece had not exceeded the discretion accorded to national authorities facing an 
economic crisis.  
But do contrasting decisions really imply inconsistent interpretation of rights through 
the relevant treaties? Would such decisions necessarily prevent common and shared 
standards of protection of social rights from being shaped and effectively 
implemented in Europe? Should the European Social Charter's rights and their 
interpretation by the ECSR be evaluated up to the level of the authority of minimum 
standards for national and European institutions? Should/could the different 
procedures and bodies available to individuals and groups of individuals at the 
European level be given a more defined, complementary role? These are some 
broad questions which require investigation and may prompt moves, under the 
several issues tackled at the Turin conference.  
Bearing such questions in mind, the present contribution will focus on the decisions 
by the European Committee of Social Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights on measures undertaken within the context of the recent crisis. The analysis 
will be aimed at pointing out the relevant standards of protection emerging from the 
two bodies, with reference to social rights, in times of economic hardship, i.e. the 
requirements that governments have to abide by when choosing how to react to an 
economic and financial crisis.  
Indeed, at its very origin, the European Social Charter was envisaged in a close 
relationship of 'complementarity' with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The latter treaty being confined to civil and political rights,3 only the right to freedom 
of association was expressly provided under art. 5 ESC and art. 11 ECHR, with few 
other rights being partially covered by provisions in both treaties. Broader substantial 
                                                          
3 For a framework of the normative relationships between the ESC and the ECHR, see, in particular, 
AKANDJI-KOMBÉ J.-F. (2010); FLAUSS J.-F. (2002); SUDRE F. (1998). 
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overlaps between the two have arisen from the case law.4 The European Court of 
Human Rights opened the Convention to the social dimension within the procedural 
guarantees set therein, in particular the right to a fair trial, and by means of the 
principle of non-discrimination. It also extended the Convention's substantive rights to 
the protection of social rights. Thus, for those States which are party to both treaties,5 
measures and practices affecting individuals' social rights have to comply with the 
standards of protection stemming from each instrument, as interpreted by its control 
body. Although interpretative synergies have been outlined between the two 
systems, they maintain separate institutions and proceedings.6 This explains why 
parallel and concurrent reviews of austerity measures were made by the ECSR and 
the ECtHR.  
In order to make a comparative analysis of such case law, an account must be given 
of the elements of the comparison, i.e. the facts (the measures under question) and 
the grounds of the claims (2.). While different grounds available in the ESC and the 
ECHR might explain divergence of outcomes, arguably the most relevant issue 
concerns the interpretative method(s) followed by each body, in particular the varying 
degree of deference accorded to the national governments in the sphere of economic 
and social policy (3.). The relevance of such insights for the conventional and 
jurisprudential architecture of the protection of human rights at the European level will 
be finally discussed (4.).  
 
2. Similar - but not identical - claims 
2.1. General economic and social measures put under question 
As far as the European Social Charter was concerned, seven collective complaints 
were issued against one single State, Greece, claiming that it had violated the 
Charter by adopting certain measures on remuneration and working conditions 
(complaints nos. 65/2011 and 66/2011) and on reductions in pensions in both public 
and private sectors (complaints nos. 76/2012 to 80/2012).7 In particular, the first set 
of complaints targeted the possibility of dismissing a person without notice or 
severance pay during the 12-month probation period in an open-ended contract and 
the possibility for a collective agreement at enterprise level to derogate from 
provisions on remuneration and working conditions set out in a collective agreement 
concluded at branch level. Another instance concerned the possibility of concluding 
"special apprenticeship contracts" with the very young without including the main 
                                                          
4 See the thorough overview by MALINVERNI G. (2014). 
5 While the ratification of the ECHR is a condition for membership to the Council of Europe, ratification of the 
ESC is not. All EU member States are bound by both the ECHR and the ESC 1961 or the ESC 1996 (see supra, 
ft. no. 2). However, while all of them are subjected to the ESC' reporting procedure, only half have accepted the 
collective complaint procedure provided in the additional, optional Protocol of 1995 (as of September 2014, it is 
in force towards Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden; apart from these EU States, only Norway is bound by it). 
Among the other Members of the Council of Europe, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland are 
bound to neither the ESC 1961 nor the ESC 1996. 
6 Strengths and weaknesses of such cross-references are outlined by AKANDJI-KOMBÉ J.-F. (2010): 151 ff., who 
also discusses the possible implementation of institutional and procedural links between the two systems, ibid., 
158 ff. 
7 For an analysis of the ECSR's decisions issued on these complaints, see ALFONSO MELLADO, C.L., JIMENA 
QUESADA, L., SALCEDO BELTRÁN, C. (2014); GUIGLIA G. (2013); JIMENA QUESADA L. (2014). 
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safeguards which were provided for by labour and social security law, and the 
possibility of paying new entrants aged under 25 below the minimum wage or daily 
wage. In the second set of parallel complaints, changes to pension schemes were 
challenged, which led to the reduction of the additions to pensions known as 
Christmas, Easter and vacation bonuses, the reductions in primary pensions and in 
auxiliary pensions, the introduction of pensioners' social solidarity contribution and 
the suspension or reduction of pensions for pensioners with an occupation.  
The European Court of Human Rights faced some of the above-mentioned Greek 
measures aimed at the pay of persons working or having worked in the public sector 
(Koufaki and ADEDY v. Greece).8 Portuguese measures under the 2012 State 
Budget Act relating to pensions were contested too (da Conceição Mateus and 
Santos Januário v. Portugal).9 These were similar to those adopted by Greece, but 
the reductions of pensions and the curtailment of the holiday and Christmas 
subsidies or equivalent benefits were applied only to the public sector and on a 
temporary basis. Several other measures were complained of, having been adopted 
by some State Parties to tackle the budgetary deficits in the context of the 
international economic crisis and, where relevant, to meet international lending 
commitments. In particular, some measures were aimed either at reducing public 
expenditure consisting of salaries in the public sector (by temporarily cutting them by 
a certain percentage but assuring the guaranteed minimum salary, in Mihăieş and 
Senteş v. Romania)10 and of benefits in the social security sector (e.g., by deleting, 
through a transitional period, the parental benefit to be allocated to a parent 
continuing working, in Šulcs and others v. Latvia,11 by outlawing the concurrent 
receipt of a pension and of a State-paid salary, in Panfile v. Romania,12 by removing 
several special pension regimes including those of the auxiliary personnel in the 
judiciary, in Frimu and others v. Romania,13 by removing the applicants' service 
pensions and replacing them with an allowance, in Markovics and others v. 
Hungary,14 by recalculating the applicant's pension as a result of State budget 
legislative amendments notwithstanding a court order on the amount payable under 
the previous mechanism of calculation, in Velikoda v. Ukraine).15 Other measures 
were directed at increasing State revenues through taxation (e.g., by establishing 
retroactive tax liability and applying a 98% tax on remunerations paid in the public 
sector which were deemed "against the public morals", in R. Sz. v. Hungary).16 
Mention should also be made to the lack of compensation to stakeholders following 
the process of nationalization of Northern Rock by the UK government, which was 
dealt with in the Grainger and others case.17 
It is worth noting that other monitoring bodies at the international level were 
addressed as regards both the content of such austerity measures and the way such 
                                                          
8 Applications nos. 57665/12 and 57657/12, Court (first section) decision of 7 May 2013 
(http://hudoc.echr.coe.int).  
9 App. nos. 62235/12 and 57725/12, Court (second section) dec. of 8 October 2013. 
10 App. nos. 44232/11 and 44605/11, Court (third section) dec. of 6 December 2011.  
11 App. no. 42923/10..., Court (third section) dec. of 6 December 2011. 
12 App. no. 13902/11, Court (third section) dec. of 20 March 2012. 
13 App. no. 45312/11..., Court (third section) dec. of 7 February 2012. 
14 App. no. 77575/11..., Court (second section) dec. of 24 June 2014. 
15 App. no. 43331/12, Court (fifth section) dec. of 3 June 2014. 
16 App. no. 41838/11, Court (second section) judgment of 2 February 2013. 
17 App. no. 34940/10, Court (fourth section) dec. of 10 July 2012. 
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measures had been adopted by single European governments, in light of these 
States' international obligations on the protection of human rights.  
As already mentioned, at the EU level, the Court of Justice was involved too, with 
respect to Greek and Portuguese austerity programmes. On the one hand, under the 
annulment procedure (art. 263 TFEU), ADEDY and single individuals challenged two 
decisions the Council had addressed to Greece. They were aimed at remedying the 
country's situation of excessive deficit, by imposing, inter alia, pay and pension 
reductions as well as reductions to family allowances. The General Court dismissed 
the applications for lack of direct concern to the applicants.18 On the other hand, the 
Tribunal do trabalho do Porto asked the EU Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling 
on the interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union 
(CFREU), having serious doubts on the compatibility of the salary reductions 
imposed on the public sector by the Portuguese 2011 State Budget Act with the 
obligations on human rights stemming from EU law towards its Member States. The 
Court denied it had competence on the case, as the act at stake did not implement 
EU law and thus did not fall within the scope of application of the Charter according 
to its art. 51, para. 1.19 
Within the International Labour Organization (ILO), different bodies expressed 
concerns about the compatibility of the Greek legislation implementing the terms of 
the loans agreed with the ‘Troika’ as well as certain EU decisions, with several ILO 
Conventions. The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations extensively analyzed Greek austerity measures, as appears in its 
last Annual Reports.20 To a lesser extent, observations related to the measures 
adopted within adjustment programmes have addressed Spain and Portugal. In 
particular, comments were made on the Portuguese government’s decisions dealing 
with minimum wages according to economic policy conditions established in the 
Memorandum of Understanding concluded with the ‘Troika’.21 Furthermore within the 
ILO, the Committee on Freedom of Association has received communications from 
trade unions on Greek and Spanish measures implemented in the context of 
international loan mechanisms and consolidation programmes, introducing labour 
                                                          
18 ECJ, ADEDY and Others v Council, Case T-541/10, General Court order of 2 November 2012, 
(http://curia.europa.eu), see also the application in [2011] OJ C30/49); ADEDY and Others v Council, Case T-
215/11, General Court order of 27 November 2012, application in [2011] OJ C186/29. 
19 ECJ, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and Others v BPN - BancoPortuguês de Negócios SA, Case C-128/12, 
Court order of 7 March 2013 (http://curia.europa.eu). 
20 Expert Committee’s Reports (esp Part II on ‘Observations concerning particular countries’), submitted to the 
100th, 101st, 102nd and 103rd Sessions of the International Labour Conference and discussed therein by the 
Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, which has published its discussions and conclusions up 
to the 102nd Session (as of October 2014). Comments are based on: i) reports received by the Greek 
government; ii) observations made under article 23 of the ILO Constitution by Greek trade unions including the 
Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) in communications submitted since 2010 and replies by the 
government; and iii) high-level missions undertaken to the country in 2011 and 2012. 
21 ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report III (Part 1A) 
(2013) ILO Doc ILC/201/III1(A) 695.  
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reforms in a way allegedly incompatible with ILO Conventions Nos 87 and 98 on 
freedom of association and collective bargaining.22 
2.2 Different rights in different treaties 
The compatibility of Greek measures concerning remuneration and working 
conditions with the European Social Charter was assessed with respect to several 
provisions of the 1961 Charter and the 1988 Additional Protocol, namely the 
obligations dealing with the right to a fair remuneration (art. 4 ESC), the right of 
children and young persons to protection (art. 7 ESC), the right to vocational training 
(art. 10 ESC) and the right to take part in the determination and improvement of the 
working conditions and working environment (art. 3 Protocol 1988), as well as with 
the right to social security in regard to the "special apprenticeship contracts" (art. 12 
ESC). The complaints against Greek pension cuts were grounded on art. 12 ESC. 
With regard to the level of pension benefits, the European Committee of Social 
Rights also referred to the right of the elderly to social protection (art. 4 Protocol 
1988).  
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, the applications against the 
Greek pay and pension cuts in the public sector referred to art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 on 
protection of property. Indeed, the latter was deemed relevant by the Court with 
reference to the vast majority of applications relating to austerity measures. 
Furthermore, in some cases, the Court admitted claims of violation of the obligation 
of non-discrimination under Art. 14 ECHR (and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 12), without 
constituting a separate standpoint for examination of the facts from other substantive 
grounds (R.Sz., Frimu), while in other cases such claims were declared inadmissible 
(Šulcs, Panfile, Koufaki and ADEDY). Although art. 8 ECHR on the right to respect 
for private and family life was also invoked in a number of applications, the Court 
tended to exclude any appearance of violation of such provision in the light of the 
material at its disposal (Šulcs, Koufaki and ADEDY).23  
Focusing on the challenge of regressive social security measures, it must be noted 
that the main causes of action under the Charter and the Convention, i.e. art. 12 ESC 
and art. 1, Prot. No. 1 ECHR, present both different (but partly overlapping) contents 
and similar limitations. 
                                                          
22 This special procedure, which supplements the general procedures for the supervision of the application of 
ILO standards, was established in 1950-51; governments or organizations of workers and of employers can 
submit complaints concerning violations of trade union rights by States even when the Conventions on freedom 
of association and collective bargaining have not been ratified. For more information, ILO (2005). The cases at 
issue are: Case no. 2820 Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE), Civil Servants’ Confederation 
(ADEDY), General Federation of Employees of the National Electric Power Corporation (GENOP–DEI–KIE) 
and Greek Federation of Private Employees (OIYE) supported by the International Confederation of Trade 
Unions (ITUC), Report no. 365, para. 784; Case no. 2918, Citizens’ Service Federation of the Trade Union 
Confederation of Workers’ Commissions (FSC-CCOO), Report no. 368, para. 323; Case no. 2947, General 
Union of Workers (UGT), Trade Union Confederation of Workers’ Commissions (CC.OO.), Public Employees 
Federation of Workers’ Trade Union (FEP-USO) and other Unions, Report no. 371, para. 317. 
23 Within the EU, the applicants in the ADEDY and Others cases claimed that the Council decisions affected 
their acquired property rights in breach of art. 1, Prot. No. 1 ECHR (implicitly contemplated within the EU legal 
order, by virtue of art. 6§3 TEU stating that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR, constitute general 
principles of the Union's law). The Portuguese tribunal asking the CJEU a preliminary ruling in the case of 
Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and Others invoked art. 31§1 CFREU on the right of every worker to working 
conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity. 
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The European Social Charter does require State Parties to establish or maintain a 
system of social security (art. 12§1 ESC). It also establishes a minimum threshold 
requirement by referring to international or European treaties (art. 12§2 ESC)24 and 
states the principle of progressiveness (art. 12§3 ESC).25 According to the 
Committee, the last provision requires State parties to "maintain the social security 
system on a satisfactory level that takes into account the legitimate expectations of 
beneficiaries of the system and the right of all persons to effective enjoyment of the 
right to social security".26 Nonetheless, as will be seen in detail below, the ECSR 
considers that reductions in the benefits available in a national security system will 
not automatically constitute a violation of art. 12§3 ESC.27 When adopting measures 
which restrict the rights guaranteed in the Charter, including art. 12, the conditions 
set out in art. 31 of the 1961 Charter (or art. E of the 1996 Charter) apply, i.e. the 
State parties must establish that these restrictions or limitations are necessary in a 
democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or for the 
protection of public interest, national security, public health, or morals.  
As far as art. 1, Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights is 
concerned, the European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that social policy 
measures may legitimately limit the enjoyment of this right. On the other hand, the 
Court extended the scope of the right to entitlements relating to social security and 
social protection: according to its well-established case law, the notion of 
"possessions" covers salaries, pensions and social benefits in general. Moreover, in 
the leading Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom decision, the Court clarified that 
all social security benefits, both contributory and non-contributory ones, fall under this 
provision.28 However, it is repeatedly maintained that the Convention does not 
guarantee a right to work nor a right to a salary or a pension of a particular amount. 
As recalled, for example, in the da Conceição Mateus and Santos Januário decision,  
"Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 places no restriction on the Contracting State’s 
freedom to decide whether or not to have in place any form of social-security 
scheme, or to choose the type or amount of benefits to provide under any 
such scheme. If, however, a Contracting State has in force legislation 
providing for the payment as of right of a pension – whether conditional or not 
on the prior payment of contributions – that legislation must be regarded as 
generating a proprietary interest falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 for persons satisfying its requirements [references]. The reduction or the 
discontinuance of a pension may therefore constitute an interference with 
possessions that needs to be justified [references]".29  
At the same time, the Court reiterates that if a State decides to create a benefit or 
pension scheme, it must do so in a manner which is compatible with art. 14 ECHR. It 
also states that the principles which apply generally in cases concerning art. 1, 
Protocol No. 1, ECHR are equally relevant when it comes to salaries or welfare 
                                                          
24 The International Labour Convention No. 102 Concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security (in the 1961 
Charter) and the European Code of Social Security (in the 1996 Charter). 
25 It is encompassed in the commitment of State parties to "endeavour to raise progressively the system of social 
security to a higher level". 
26 E.g., complaint no. 79/2012, decision on the merits of 7 December 2012, para. 65. 
27 Conclusions XVI-1, Statement of interpretation on Article 12. 
28 App. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, Court (Grand Chamber) dec. of 6 July 2005, paras. 50-53. 
29 da Conceição Mateus, cit., para. 18. 
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benefits.30 As is reflected in the structure of that article, any interference with the right 
to peaceful enjoyment of property must strike a "fair balance" between the demands 
of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the 
individual's rights. In particular, there must be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought by the measures 
enacted by the State. This is assessed against three requirements: any interference 
with an individual's right must be set by law, pursue a legitimate interest and the 
means chosen must be proportionate to this interest. Notably, the same requirements 
apply to limitations to the rights guaranteed under arts. 8 to 11 ECHR, as any 
interference with those rights must be lawful, pursue a legitimate aim in the public 
interest and be "necessary in a democratic society".  
 
3. The relevance of according narrower or wider discretion to States 
Although the European Committee of Social Rights has shown attention for the 
interpretative methods of the European Court of Human Rights, it has developed its 
own interpretations of particular provisions of the European Social Charter and made 
findings on the violation of the Charter both separately and distinctly. Overall, from 
previous and recent, crisis-related case law, it results that States' defence based on 
the margin of appreciation plays a minor role in the Committee's assessment than at 
the Court.31 The differences in the tests which are applied by the two bodies with 
respect to the cases under review are well illustrated when it comes to assess the 
compatibility of social benefit reductions with the respective treaties. 
3.1 Reiterating their own previous approaches... 
Under the European Social Charter, compliance with art. 12 on the right to social 
security in a context of economic hardship is verified by the European Committee of 
Social Rights according to a well-established methodology. The overall approach 
was declared in the General Introduction of the Conclusions XIII-4 (1993-1997): it 
aimed at maintaining the "common feature" of Contracting Parties' social security 
systems despite their different features, i.e. the endeavour "to protect all those who 
may be subject to any of the dangers covered". The Committee recognizes the close 
relationship existing between the economy and social rights and considers that the 
pursuit of economic goals is not necessarily incompatible with the principle of 
progressiveness seen in art. 12§3 ESC.32 The consolidation of public finances 
against deficit and debt increase may be a means of safeguarding the social security 
system.33 Thus, the ECSR made it clear that alterations in social security systems 
are allowed to the extent that  
                                                          
30 e.g., Koufaki and ADEDY, cit., para. 32. 
31 See CULLEN H. (2009). As is well-known, the ECtHR recognizes that States enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation when implementing the rights guaranteed by the Convention. This, in light of the principle of 
subsidiarity of the protection of human rights at the international level with reference to the national dimension. 
The Court considers that because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities 
are better placed than the international judge to appreciate the existence of a problem of public concern 
warranting measures of control and the choice of the means pursuing the public interest at stake. Nonetheless, 
the legislature's judgment is not outside the Court's control. Recently, see LEGG A. (2012). 
32 Conclusions XVI-1, 1998; also, complaint no. 79/2012, decision on the merits, cit., para. 67. 
33 Conclusions XIV-1, Austria. 
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"these are necessary in order to ensure the maintenance of the system in 
question (...) and where any restrictions do not interfere with the effective 
protection of all members of society against the occurrence of social and 
economic risks and do not tend to gradually reduce the social security system 
to a system of minimum assistance."34  
However, the Committee reserves the possibility of assessing whether the methods 
chosen by the Contracting Parties to achieve these objectives are appropriate. In its 
General observation on art. 12§3 ESC, the Committee specified the test which 
enables it to carry out a full assessment of the conformity of national situations 
following restrictive changes into legislation or practices for demographic, economic 
and financial reasons.35 State Parties are required to provide information on the 
following elements:  
"- the nature of the changes (field of application, conditions for granting 
allowances, amounts of allowance, lengths etc...); - the reasons given for the 
changes (the aims pursued) and the framework of social and economic policy 
in which they arise; - the extent of the changes introduced (categories and 
numbers of people concerned, levels of allowances before and after 
alteration); - the existence of measures of social assistance for those who find 
themselves in a situation of need as a result of the changes made (this 
information can be submitted under Article 13); - the results obtained by such 
changes (their adequacy)."36  
In particular, the Committee also identifies indicators of minimum thresholds to be 
respected, by determining for example that the income of the elderly should not be 
lower than the poverty line.37 
Turning to the approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in the 
cases under review, the Court rehearses its settled case law with respect to the 
rights at issue when it comes to spheres involving the application of social and 
economic policies. 
As concerns the requirement that any limitation must be set by law, the Court stated 
that "the existence of a legal basis in domestic law does not suffice, in itself, to satisfy 
the principle" but that the legal basis must be "compatible with the rules of law and 
must provide guarantees against arbitrariness".38 As confirmed in the recent case law 
related to austerity measures, the Court is usually satisfied with the provision of the 
interference by an act of the legislature. However, regarding tax, the Court accepts 
that States are afforded "some degree of additional deference and latitude in the 
exercise of their fiscal functions".39 
Under the requirement of the legitimacy of the aim pursued, according to the Court's 
well-established case law, the notion of "public interest" is necessarily extensive and 
a wide margin of appreciation is usually allowed to the States under the Convention 
                                                          
34 Conclusions XVI-1, 1998. 
35 Conclusions XIII-4. 
36 Conclusions XVI-1, 1998. 
37 Conclusions 2009, e.g. Ireland. 
38 R.Sz., cit., para. 36. 
39 Ibid., para. 39. The ECtHR's case law on fiscal meaures is reviewed by ERGEC R. (2011). 
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when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy,40 including 
policies concerning pensions and social benefits.41 The Court justifies the latitude left 
to national authorities by observing that opinions within a democratic society may 
reasonably differ widely on matters of general social and economic policy.42 This 
approach applies to laws regulating social policy in view to balancing State 
expenditure and revenue: the Court's control will be limited to verifying that the 
legislature's judgment is not "manifestly without reasonable foundation". More 
specifically, the Court considers that the decision to enact law to balance State 
expenditure and revenue commonly involves the consideration of political, economic 
and social issues, thus the national authorities are, in principle, better placed than the 
international judge to choose the most appropriate means of achieving that aim.43 
The margin is even wider when the issue involves an assessment of the priorities as 
to the allocation of limited State resources.44  
It is at the stage of the Court's evaluation of the third requirement, i.e. on the 
"proportionality" of the means chosen by the State in relation to the aims pursued, 
that each right at issue in a given case comes into relevance. In particular, under art. 
1, Protocol No. 1 ECHR, the Court considers that the requisite fair balance is not 
struck where the person concerned bears an individual and excessive burden.45 In 
turn, when the measure concerns pension rights or social legislation in general, what 
counts is whether "the applicant's right to derive benefits from the social insurance 
scheme in question has been infringed in a manner resulting in the impairment of the 
essence of the right".46 The Court recalls its previous case law according to which "a 
total deprivation of entitlements resulting in the loss of the means of subsistence 
would in principle amount to a violation of the right of property", while "the imposition 
of a reasonable and commensurate reduction would not".47 Another relevant factor 
relates to the nature of the benefit removed, i. e. whether it belonged to a special 
advantageous scheme available only to a certain group of persons or not. In any 
case, the assessment varies depending on the particular circumstances of the case 
and the applicant's personal situation.48 
3.2 ... and applying them (with some variations) 
The European Committee of Social Rights has maintained its general attitude 
towards the relation between economy and social rights, when controlling the respect 
for the European Social Charter in the recent crisis period. On the one hand, this 
means that the application of the Charter cannot be suspended because of fiscal 
consolidation needs but the individuals must be guaranteed effective protection of 
their social rights. Such a tone is set in the general introduction to the Conclusions 
                                                          
40 James and Others v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 8793/79, Commission (Plenary) report of 11 May 1984. 
41 Stec, Court (Grand Chamber) judgment of 12 April 2006, paras. 51-52; see, e.g., Panfile, cit., para. 27, Frimu, 
cit., para. 41, Grainger, cit., para. 36. 
42 Stec, 2006, cit., para. 52; see R. Sz., cit., para. 38. 
43 Janković v. Croatia, app. no. 43440/98, Court (fourth section) dec. of 12 October 2000; see Koufaki and 
ADEDY, cit., para. 31. 
44 E.g., Pentiacova and Others v. Moldova, app. no. 14462/03, Court (fourth section) dec. of 4 January 2005; in 
the recent case law relating to austerity measures, see Koufaki and ADEDY, cit., para. 31. 
45 E.g., Panfile, cit., para. 16, da Conceição Mateus, cit., para. 23, R. Sz., cit., paras. 50-51. 
46 E.g., Panfile, cit., para. 24. 
47 See Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland, app. no 60669/00, Court (second section) judgment of 12 October 2004, 
paras. 39-45; see further references in da Conceição Mateus, cit., para. 24. 
48 As far as taxation is concerned, see R.Sz., cit., paras. 52-53. 
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XIX-2 (2009) on the repercussions of the economic crisis on social rights. Here, the 
ECSR concludes that  
“the economic crisis should not have as a consequence the reduction of the 
protection of the rights recognised by the Charter. Hence, the governments 
are bound to take all necessary steps to ensure that the rights of the Charter 
are effectively guaranteed at a period of time when beneficiaries need the 
protection most.”  
However, on the other hand, in times of economic crisis the effective realization of 
the rights enshrined in the Charter is assessed with reference to the reasonableness 
of the changes, and the proportionality of the burden suffered by individuals:  
"while it may be reasonable for state parties to respond to the crisis by 
changing current legislation and practices to limit public expenditure or relieve 
constraints on business activity, such measures should not excessively 
destabilise the situation of those who enjoy the rights enshrined in the 
Charter."49 
The Committee does not restraint itself from assessing the adequacy of the method 
chosen by national authorities to counteract the crisis, against what is required in 
conformity with the Charter:  
“doing away with such guarantees would not only force [the persons 
concerned] to shoulder an excessively large share of the consequences of the 
crisis but also accept pro-cyclical effects liable to make the crisis worse and to 
increase the burden on welfare systems, particularly social assistance, unless 
it was decided at the same time to stop fulfilling the obligations of the Charter 
in the area of social protection”.50  
This approach is applied equally to such rights as the rights to health, social security 
and social protection, and labour law. The combination of the principles in these 
areas results in the following levels of protection. 
As regards labour rights, because the establishment and maintenance of labour law 
is a core objective of the Charter, which protects employees against arbitrary 
decisions by their employers or the worst effects of economic fluctuations, "measures 
taken to encourage greater employment flexibility with a view to combating 
unemployment should not deprive broad categories of employees of their 
fundamental rights in the field of labour law". Hence, the lack of provisions for notice 
periods or severance pay in a case such as the probationary period envisaged by the 
Greek legislation (see supra) renders the guarantees provided by them ineffective 
and constitutes a violation of the ESC.51 
Regarding the right to social security, and specifically art. 12§3 ESC, the said 
approach implies that the introduction of measures aimed at consolidating public 
finances may be necessary to ensure the maintenance and sustainability of the 
existing social security system. However, those measures which fail to  
                                                          
49 Complaint no. 66/2011, decision on the merits of 23 May 2012, para. 13. 
50 Complaint no. 65/2011, decision on the merits of 23 May 2012, para. 18. 
51 Ibid., paras. 26-28 
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"maintain in place a sufficiently extensive system of compulsory social security 
and refrain from excluding entire categories of workers from the social 
protection offered by this system (...) constitute retrogressive steps which 
cannot be deemed to be in conformity with Article 12§3".52  
Hence, the Charter is violated by measures such as those establishing the special 
conditions of "special apprenticeship contracts" (see above), which have "the 
practical effect of establishing a distinct category of workers who are effectively 
excluded from the general range of protection offered by the social security system at 
large".53 Most relevantly, with reference to the second set of collective complaints 
against Greece, the Committee found that certain individual measures complained of, 
would not in themselves constitute violations of the Charter. However, the Committee 
pointed out that the cumulative effect of the restrictions was such as to bring about "a 
significant degradation of the standard of living and the living conditions of many of 
the pensioners concerned".54 It so stated, in light of the factual information provided 
by the complainant organizations. The ECSR also found that the Greek government 
had not met the requirements of art. 12§3 ESC as it had not established that efforts 
had been made to maintain a sufficient level of protection for the benefit of the most 
vulnerable members of society, in particular by investigating and discovering whether 
other measures could have been put in place to offset the negative consequences of 
the restrictions to pensions.55 In particular, the government should have conducted a 
minimum level of research and analysis into the effects of the far-reaching measures 
it would adopt on the vulnerable groups of society. Furthermore, the government 
should have discussed the available studies with the organizations representing the 
interests of groups mostly affected by the measures.56 
On the contrary, as far as the European Court of Human Rights is concerned, by 
applying the margin of appreciation doctrine in the cases related to the economic 
crisis the findings generally exclude that the States at issue violated the 
Convention.57 In particular, it clearly emerges that States are accorded a broad 
leverage when setting the legitimate aims to be pursued in the context of an 
economic crisis and that interference with the applicants' rights is accepted, unless 
the applicants are totally deprived of the rights at issue. It has been advanced that 
the margin of appreciation "can result in situations of concern" as today the Court "is 
not untouched by the dominant austerity discourse".58 
The Court states that the aim to re-establish the balance in the State social budget is 
to be considered as legitimate and that for purposes of sustainability of the overall 
social budget, a specific social benefit may be affected.59 The Court also accepts the 
purposes of safeguarding the budgetary equilibrium of a State which faces an 
                                                          
52 Complaint no. 66/2011, decision on the merits, cit., para. 47. 
53 Ibid., para. 48. 
54 Complaint no. 79/2012, decision on the merits, cit., para. 73. 
55Ibid., para. 77. Similarly, Complaint no. 66/2011, decision on the merits, cit., para. 47.  
56Complaint no. 79/2012, decision on the merits, cit., para. 75. GUIGLIA G. (2013) notes that the Committee 
envisages the obligation stemming from art. 12§3 ESC as being an obligation of results, not only an obligation of 
means. 
57 This leads the Court to declare most of the cases inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded under art. 35 §§ 3 and 
4 ECHR. 
58 TULKENS F. (2014). 
59 Šulcs, cit., paras. 25 and 29. 
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economic crisis,60 of rationalising public expenditure as dictated by the exceptional 
context of a global crisis on a financial and economic level, and of correcting existing 
inequalities among different pension schemes in the economic crisis context.61 It 
must be pointed out that the Court is prompted to recognize the legitimate nature of 
such aims as it stems from the decisions made by the national supreme courts, 
whose reasoning is expressly "referred to" or "taken account of".62  
On this point, it is worth recalling that at the national level, the intricacies of and 
relations among fiscal consolidation measures, the need for international financial 
assistance in times of economic emergency, and the obligations stemming from 
membership of international/European organizations have weighed on the decisions 
adopted by some national supreme courts on the compatibility of certain austerity 
measures with constitutional principles and human rights guarantees.63 This has 
occurred in Greece,64 Portugal,65 and Spain.66 
At the same time and accordingly, specific considerations on the intensity and 
exceptional nature of the crisis are devoted by the European Court of Human Rights 
to the Greek and Portuguese austerity measures. Not only did the Court refer to the 
Greek Supreme Administrative Court, but it also noted that "the adoption of the 
impugned measures was justified by the existence of an exceptional crisis without 
precedent in recent Greek history" and that these measures were part of a broader 
legislative intervention encompassing tax equity and tax evasion, reform of the social 
security system, audit of the public finances, and market liberalization.67 Similarly, as 
regards Portugal, the Court cites long excerpts from a report by the European 
                                                          
60 Mihăieş and Senteş, cit., para. 7. 
61 Frimu, cit., para. 42. 
62Šulcs, cit., para. 25, Panfile, cit., para. 21, Frimu, cit., para. 44, Koufaki and ADEDY, cit., para. 38, Grainger, 
cit., para.39.  
63 On the judiciary reaction to the crisis in several European States, see CONTIADES X. ET AL. (2013). 
64 Quite extensive quotations of relevant paragraphs from the Greek Council of Stateʼs decision No 668/2012 are 
contained in Koufaki and ADEDY v Greece, cit. On the decisions adopted by the Greek Council of State on the 
appeals lodged by the Athens Bar Association, regional bar associations, several trade unions and other bodies as 
well as individuals against wage and benefit cuts based on the Memorandum of Understanding agreed by the 
Greek Central Bank with the ʻTroikaʼ, see, among others, CONTIADES X., FOTIADOU A. (2012): esp. 682-684.  
65 Portuguese Constitutional Tribunal: Acórdão no. 396/2011 [2011] 199 Diário da República, 1ª série 41096; 
Acórdão no. 353/2012 [2012] 140 Diário da República, 1ª série 3846; Acórdão no. 187/2013 [2013] 78 Diário da 
República, 1ª série 2328, esp paras 26, 29-30, 35, 41. On these judgements, NOGUEIRA DE BRITO M. (2012); 
CISOTTA R, GALLO D. (2013); MOLA L. (2013). 
66Auto no. 85/2011 [7/6/2011] Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE 4/7/2011) (Spanish Constitutional Court); see 
also Decrees nos. 101/2011 and 104/2011 of 5 July 2011. The Court refused to consider the issue of the alleged 
unconstitutionality of the Royal Decree-Law no. 8/2010 which adopts extraordinary measures to reduce the 
public deficit. This act inter alia suspends a collective agreement relating to an increase in remunerations 
throughout the public administration. The Court put forward arguments concerning the need and urgency of the 
Act aimed at limiting repercussions of the crisis on sovereign debt and the consequences for State financing 
(Auto no. 85/2011, par.a I-3). As regards the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association's review of these 
measures, notably the first report issued on Spain was adopted after the Tribunal Constitucional de España 
refused to consider the issue of the alleged unconstitutionality of governmental measures vis-à-vis financial 
threats. It thus echoes national courts on the intricate relations among austerity measures, commitments 
stemming from adhesion to the EU Economic and Monetary Union, and a widespread economic crisis. At the 
same time, it recalls its ‘case law’ on the conditions of admissible restrictions to the right of collective bargaining 
undertaken as emergency measures, as part of a government’s stabilization policy. In this case, the Committee 
"invites the Government to, in the future, consider, within the framework of social dialogue, the principles set 
forth in the conclusions regarding collective bargaining in the event of economic difficulty or crisis". See ILO 
Freedom of Association Committee, Report no. 368, cit., paras 361-364; see also Report no. 317, cit., para. 465. 
67 Koufaki and ADEDY, cit., paras. 37 and 39. 
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Commission on the country's situation and observes that the magnitude of the 
programme encompassing public spending cuts "shows that the economic crisis (...) 
and its effect on the State budget balance were exceptional in nature", with further 
reference to the Constitutional Court. According to the ECtHR, this shows that the 
restrictive measures "were clearly in the public interest within the meaning of Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1".68 Thus, the Court's review on the adequacy of the measure is 
limited to its reasonableness and suitability to achieving the legitimate aim being 
pursued. In particular, the Court does not enquire into the question whether the 
national authorities have adopted the best solution or should have exercised their 
discretion in another way.69 
As regards the evaluation on the proportionality of the measures at stake under art. 
1, Protocol No. 1 ECHR, various degrees of interference are allowed indeed. Thus, 
for example, the Court identifies the essence of the right to parental benefit in the 
provision for a substitute of loss of earnings caused by the birth of a child, and finds 
that the fact that alternative options providing for income remained available to new 
parents entails that they were not deprived of their right.70 The Court also considered 
that an individual which, following the measures at stake, received an income higher 
than the national gross average salary, did not suffer a total deprivation of his 
entitlements, nor was divested of all means of subsistence.71 Again, Greece was 
allowed a very wide margin of appreciation by referring to the national judge ("the 
Court attaches particular weight to the reasons given by the Supreme Administrative 
Court").72 Neither the retroactive nature of the Greek cuts nor their permanent 
provision affected the Court's judgment on their proportionality, although the Court 
would then positively emphasize the transitory character of the Portuguese cuts on 
social security benefits as compared to the Greek ones.73 
Among quite consistent ECtHR's case law relating to austerity measures, the case of 
R. Sz. is to be singled out. Here, the Court found that the applicant suffered an 
excessive and individual burden. The Court assumed that the measures served the 
interest of the State budget at a time of economic hardship. However, it noted that 
the measures at issue only targeted a certain group of individuals, apparently 
because their pay originated from the public purse, while the majority of citizens were 
not obliged to contribute, to a comparable extent, to the public burden. In addition, 
the Court did not make reference to the level attained by the income of the applicant 
following the implementation of the measures, but noted that he was deprived of "the 
larger [sic] part of an acquired right", namely the right to severance pay, which serves 
the special social interest of labour-market reintegration. The doubts on the 
legitimacy of the aims pursued and other specific circumstances of the case were 
certainly relevant too. However, the general considerations made by the Court may 
have broader implications, as will be seen below. 
 
4. Critical remarks 
                                                          
68 da Conceição Mateus, cit., para. 25. 
69 Markovics, cit., para. 39. The Court also considered that the possible existence of alternative solutions does 
not in itself render the contested legislation unjustified, in Koufaki and ADEDY, cit., para. 48. 
70 Šulcs, cit., para. 31. 
71 Panfile, cit., para. 23. 
72 Koufaki and ADEDY, cit., para. 44. 
73 da Conceição Mateus, cit., para. 26. 
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Taking all the cases under review into consideration, do the European Social Charter 
and the European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the Committee 
and the Court respectively, share common standards of protection of social rights in 
times of economic crisis? The analysis of the above seems to show that the major 
difference in the case law of the ECSR and the ECtHR on austerity measures lies in 
the approach to and the intensity of the review of national choices. However, this 
may be justified by the different nature of the control mechanisms and the underlying 
treaties. This is exactly the point around which further reflection is needed, should 
truly European social rights standards be the desirable outcome of an integrated 
system of protection of human rights. Four comments may reasonably be made in 
this respect.  
The first one is prompted by observing that, within the 'austerity'-related case law, the 
European Committee of Social Rights has made extensive reference to a broad 
range of international authorities, as regards the impact of the crisis on the enjoyment 
of human rights and the content of the specific social rights under review. On the 
contrary, the European Court of Human Rights has accorded higher attention to the 
national courts within its margin-of-appreciation approach. Indeed, as highlighted in 
the literature74, the degree of deference accorded by the ECtHR to the national 
authorities depends on some external factors. In particular, the margin of 
appreciation is narrower when there is ‒ in the Court's own words in the Demir and 
Baykara judgment ‒ a "consensus emerging from specialised international 
instruments and from the practice of Contracting States"; in fact, this "may constitute 
a relevant consideration for the Court when it interprets the provisions of the 
Convention in specific cases".75 Indeed, in a case regarding freedom of association 
and the exercise of the right to collective action, the Court has recently 
acknowledged that  
"the interpretative value of the ECSR [in the matter] appears to be generally 
accepted by States and by the Committee of Ministers. It is certainly accepted 
by the Court, which has repeatedly had regard to the ECSR's interpretation of 
the Charter and its assessment of State compliance with its various 
provisions".76  
May such consideration emerge as far as social protection is concerned? It should be 
noted that national courts' and the Committee's assessments on the respect by 
austerity measures for social rights have been divergent in the vast majority of cases 
so far. Moreover, a distinct approach vis-à-vis State Parties' other international 
obligations emerges between the European Committee of Social Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights. While the latter has considered that pursuance of 
objectives set at the EU and multilateral level added legitimacy to austerity 
measures,77 the former has specified that any measure agreed at the international 
level which relates to matter within the scope of the Charter should comply with the 
                                                          
74 LEGG A. (2012): esp. 116 ff. 
75 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, app. no. 34503/97, Court (Grand Chamber) judgment of 12 November 2008, 
para. 85. Here, a decision by the ECSR played a fundamental role in the evolution of the Court's jurisprudence 
with regard to the right of freedom of association in the public sector, even though Turkey had not accepted (and 
has not accepted yet) the relevant Charter's right, i.e. art. 5 ESC (see the ESC's Parties' accepted provisions on: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/ProvisionTableRevMarch2013_en.pdf). 
76 National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 31045/10, 
Court (fourth section) judgment of 4 April 2014, para. 94. 
77 Koufaki, para. 38. 
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obligations stemming from this treaty.78 In practice, only by strengthening the force 
and role of the European Social Charter and its controlling bodies' determinations 
within national legal orders (and the EU's) could a virtual circle be drawn concerning 
the spheres of labour and social protection in general. 
A second remark follows the Strasbourg Court's assertion on the "distinct character 
of the Court's review compared with that of the supervisory procedures of (...) the 
European Social Charter".79 The Court highlighted that the European Committee of 
Social Rights and itself examine national measures from different standpoints. The 
Committee reviews the relevant domestic law and practice "in the abstract" (i.e., in 
more general terms and with broad categories of individuals or the population in 
mind), the Courts determines whether the actual implementation of relevant domestic 
law has affected the applicant in a manner that infringes the Convention's right at 
issue.80 It is true that several general situations falling under the review of the 
Committee may also be challenged in an individual application to the Court, but the 
focus adopted in evaluating such measures has varying implications on the findings. 
Indeed, this seems to be reflected in the differences between the Koufaki and 
ADEDY case before the ECtHR and the collective complaints against Greece before 
the ECSR. While the Court did not find an excessive burden on the applicant in the 
instant case with respect of a single measure affecting her right to property, the 
Committee avoided assessing the impact of individual measures but found that their 
cumulative implementation violated the country's obligations under the Charter, as 
they risked bringing about "a large scale pauperisation of a significant segment of the 
population".81 Moreover, the Committee itself, on the one hand, extensively quoted 
the Court's jurisprudence and recognized that pension entitlements is a matter on 
which individuals may have legitimate expectations in respect of the stability of the 
rules applicable to social security benefits under the principle of progressiveness. On 
the other hand, the Committee considered that "other mechanisms are more suited to 
address complaints relating to the effects of the contested legislation on individual 
pensioners' right to property. In this regard, also domestic courts are in a significant 
role".82 It thus envisaged a complementary role to be played by regional and national 
courts and supervisory bodies. 
Thirdly, but linked with the previous point, is the importance of the grounds on which 
violations are claimed under each treaty - the European Social Charter and the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Although the constructive interpretation of 
art. 1, Protocol No. 1, ECHR has resulted in significant openness of the Convention 
to social protection (see supra, 2.2), the recent case law on austerity measures 
seems to show the limitation of this advance compared with the situation resulting 
from an overall programme of economic and social reform. However large the notion 
of "possession" under that provision is, its scope nonetheless depends on the 
entitlements granted within the national legal orders. Moreover, the guarantee which 
is recognized to the right to property qualifies it as a "weak" right within the 
Convention's context. It may be argued that other grounds therein would better fit the 
                                                          
78 Complaint no. 79/2012, decision on the merits, paras. 46-48. 
79 RMT, para. 98. 
80 Ibid. The collective complaint procedure may prevent ex-post-facto individual claims, as it is not premised on 
the rule of prior exhaustion of local remedies, which instead constitutes a criterion of admissibility of individual 
applications before the European Court of Human Rights (art. 35§1 ECHR): BELORGEY J.M. (2011). 
81 Complaint no. 79/2012, decision on the merits, para. 77. 
82 Ibid., para. 78. 
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situation incurred by individuals, especially by the most vulnerable in the society, as a 
consequence of the crisis and of austerity programmes. Notably, a stricter test of 
proportionality is adopted by the Court where a measure interferes with "the 
individual's identity, self-determination, physical and moral integrity, maintenance of 
relationship with others and settled and secure place in the community". This is the 
sphere of action of article 8 ECHR.83 Within the limits of the present contribution, 
suffice it to notice that there are both promising developments, but also limits with 
regard to tackling poverty in the text of the Convention and in the Court's case law. 
This may occur from the standpoints of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading 
treatment, the right to access to justice, the rights to private and family life and 
respect for the home, if not even a right to housing.84  
Finally, if one sticks to the above case law and excepts the peculiar aspects of the 
two systems, it may be asked whether any common indications are addressed by the 
Committee and the Court to European governments, as regards their obligations in 
the field of social rights in the context of an economic crisis. Within the Convention's 
ambit, the focus on individual applicants and the approach according governments a 
broad margin of appreciation leads the Court to exclude in the vast majority of cases 
that individuals suffer an excessive burden as a result of cuts in pensions or wages. 
This is found when the individuals' situations are compared with the majority of the 
population, for example because the reductions concerned special advantages that 
had been previously granted to the category the individuals belonged to. Yet, this 
finding is sometimes also justified in light of the circumstance that the individuals are 
not deprived of their means of subsistence, or the essence of the right, in particular 
as their income does not fall below the average national income after the application 
of the measure at issue. In the context of the European Social Charter, the 
Committee reiterates that regressive measures on pensions and wages may be 
reasonably adopted provided that distinct, broad categories of persons are not 
deprived of their fundamental rights. In concreto, the Committee finds that the 
Charter is violated by referring to the poverty line as the minimum threshold. Yet, the 
established poverty line is a country-based indicator relating to the household 
average income, thus subject to economic trends.85 Overall, both the Committee and 
the Court have accepted the balancing between the general objective of fiscal 
consolidation and the safeguard of individual human rights, but required that a 
minimum core of protection is preserved.86 The issue is to give content to such 
minimum threshold and the related minimum obligations of States, in particular 
whether the minimum protection should be set in relative or absolute terms as 
regards its content and the persons concerned. 
                                                          
83 Connors v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 66746/01, Court (first section) judgment of 27 May 2004, para. 81, 
see esp. paras. 81–84; see, recently, Berger-Krall and Others v. Slovenia, app. no. 14717/04, Court (fifth section) 
judgment of 12 June 2014, para. 268. 
84 See MALINVERNI G. (2014); TULKENS F. (2014). For a discussion of the limits of the protection of social 
rights through such ECHR articles, see NAPOLETANO N. (2014): 417 ff. For example, measures in the housing 
sector may fall under both art. 1, Protocol No. 1 or art. 8 ECHR. In the Court's settled case law, the margin of 
appreciation in housing matters is narrower when it comes to the latter provision (Connors, cit., para. 82). The 
right to housing is enounced by art. 31 of the Revised ESC (1996): see GUIGLIA G. (2011).  
85 In the ESCR's 'case law', the established level of poverty line is 50% of the national average wage (see 
collective complaint no. 66/2011 as regards the wages of the young persons according to Greek legislation), or 
40% of median equivalised income as calculated by Eurostat (see the part on the income of the elderly in the 
collective complaints nos. 76-80/2012). 
86 For broader analysis of this line of argument, see COSTAMAGNA F. (2014). 
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